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Civil Rights-Sex Discrimination-EMPLOYER'S DENIAL OF DIsABILITY
BENEFITS HELD TO VIOLATE TITLE VII OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS Acr-Gilbert
v. General Electric Co., 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
Prior to 1971' women found little relief in the courts for claims of sex
discrimination. The Supreme Court upheld almost all legislation designed
for the "protection" of women,2 predicated on their virtue,' their health,4
or the "well being of [their] race." 5 The first major legislative prohibition
of sex discrimination, outside of judicial interpretation of the equal protec-
tion clause,6 is found in Title VIP of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.8 It seems
ironic that a provision on sex discrimination, today a frequently litigated
issue,' was amended to Title VII almost as an afterthought." This may be
1. The Supreme Court first subjected state legislation affecting women's rights to some-
thing more than minimal scrutiny in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court therein
employed an intermediate level of review. See generally Gunther, Foreword: In Search of
Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a New Equal Protection. The Supreme
Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1972).
2. See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 141 (1873) (upholding the right of the
state of Illinois to deny a woman a license to practice law) (Bradley, J., concurring).
3. See Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948) (upholding a Michigan statute prohibit-
ing a woman from tending bar unless she was the wife or daughter of a male owner).
4. See Radice v. New York, 264 U.S. 292, 294 (1924) (upholding a New York statute which
did not allow women to work in restaurants at night).
5. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412, 422 (1908) (upholding an Oregon statute that
limited women from working more than ten hours per day in factories, laundries, or "mechan-
ical establishments").
6. See note 21 and accompanying text infra.
7. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974) [hereinafter cited as Title VII]. For a numerical
breakdown of the proportion of Title VII cases relating to sex discrimination see Hollowell,
Women and Equal Employment: From Romantic Paternalism to the 1964 Civil Rights Act,
56 WOMAN LAW. J. 28, 30 (1970).
8. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e et seq. (1974).
9. See generally Draper, A Historical Sketch of the Major Labor Law Developments That
Have Occurred As A Result of The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Activities of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, 18 How. L.J. 29 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Draper].
One indicator might be the proliferation of law review articles based on sex discrimination.
CUMULATION 14, INDEX To LEGAL PERIODICALS (Sept. 1964 - Aug. 1967) shows no articles listed
under the heading "Sex Discrimination"; CUMULATION 15 (Sept. 1967 - Aug. 1970) lists 18
articles under that heading; CUMULATON 16 (Sept. 1970 - Aug. 1973) lists 26; VOLUME (Sept.
1973 - Aug. 1974) lists 79.
10. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (amendment of Congressman Smith of Virginia). The
codified version of the legislative history of Title VII in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs, 88th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) (Vol. 2) does not have the word "sex" added to Title VII at 2401, 2403,
and 2455, and makes no reference to sex discrimination at all. The word "sex" was amended
to Title VII without formal legislative hearing and with little floor debate. See 110 CONG. REC.
2577-84 (1964) (remarks of Congresswoman Green). See also Developments in the Law: Em-
ployment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARv. L. REv. 1109,
1196 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Employment Discrimination].
RECENT DECISIONS
the reason Title VII, at its inception, had less impact upon sex-based
discrimination than on other types of discrimination."
Congress established the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC)'2 to administer and enforce the provisions of the Title. Because
the EEOC was initially endowed with little enforcement power,'3 it proved
ineffective." In 1972 Congress amended Title VII" by granting the EEOC
access to the federal courts to redress any discernible discriminatory
employment practices." In addition, to render itself a more vital anti-
discriminatory force, the EEOC began issuing guidelines'7 which, while not
having the force of law, have generally been considered persuasive author-
ity by the courts.'"
Litigants have employed various means" to attack sex discrimination,
using both Title VII2 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment.2' Gilbert v. General Electric Co." represents such an action.
Plaintiffs-Appellees,n women employees of General Electric, first filed a
Title VII complaint24 with the EEOC to recover disability benefits for
pregnancy leave denied them by the employer.2 Having secured a favora-
11. See LAB. REL. REP., FEP, 421:601 (1973); Comment, Sex Discrimination in Employ-
ment: What Has Title VII Accomplished for the Female?, 9 U. RicH. L. REv. 149 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Title V Accomplishments].
12. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (4) (1974).
13. Title VII Accomplishments, supra note 11, at 150.
14. Employment Discrimination, supra note 10, at 1196.
15. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1)-(17) (1974).
16. Id. See also Draper, supra note 9, at 31.
17. 29 C.F.R. § 1604 et seq. (1975). The EEOC published no pregnancy guidelines until
1972. 37 Fed. Reg. 6835 (1972).
18. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971); Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S.
1, 16 (1965).
19. See Draper, supra note 9, at 69.
20. See, e.g., Wellingham v. Macon Tel. Publishing Co., 482 F.2d 535 (5th Cir. 1973);
Moody v. Albemarle Paper Co., 474 F.2d 134 (4th Cir. 1973); Sprogis v. United Air Lines,
444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
21. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971);
Bowen v. Hackett, 361 F. Supp. 854 (D.R.I. 1973). See also Developments in the Law, Equal
Protection, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1065 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Equal Protection].
22. 519 F.2d 661 (4th Cir. 1975).
23. In addition to Martha Gilbert there were six other female employees who were joined
by the International Union of Electrical, Radio and Machine Workers (IUE) and Local 161
(Salem, Va.) of the International Union.
24. A complainant must first file the complaint with the EEOC which allows the EEOC
to investigate and determine the validity of the complaint. If the EEOC finds the complaint
justified it attempts to get the employer to correct its position before aiding the complainant
in bringing the action in court.
25. Pregnancy issues were at first dominated by actions to overcome mandatory leave
policies. These usually were brought by teachers under the equal protection clause as Title
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ble decision by the EEOC, 6 the employees instituted a Title VII action in
the federal district court against the still recalcitrant employer. Before
the district court could deal with the substantive issues of the case, it ruled
upon several motions,2 and litigated a class action issue.Y The district
court then found for the plaintiffs,29 concluding that the defendants were
engaging in deliberate and intentional discriminatory practices. 0 On ap-
peal the Fourth Circuit affirmed.'
In order to rebut the charge of sex discrimination, General Electric ad-
vanced many reasons" for making pregnancy-related absences non-
compensable. The first was that pregnancy, being voluntary and subject
to planning, is neither a sickness nor an accident. The court noted that this
defense of the disability plan was raised against only this pregnancy-
related voluntary disability, while other voluntary disabilities, such as
cosmetic surgery, were covered by the plan." General Electric's second
defense focused on certain EEOC guidelines stating that denial of benefits
for pregnancy does not constitute sex discrimination.34 The court dismissed
VII did not apply to public employees until amended as 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (a), P.L. 92-261,
86 Stat. 103 (1972). See, e.g., Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Bd., 474 F.2d 395 (4th
Cir. 1973), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Green v. Waterford Bd. of
Educ., 473 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1973); LeFleur v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 465 F.2d 1184 (6th
Cir. 1972), aff'd, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
26. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., N.Y.D.C. 3-093 (PX2B) (May 18, 1973). In 1972 the EEOC
pregnancy guidelines provided in part:
§ 1604.10(b) Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion,
childbirth, and recovery therefrom are, for all job related purposes, temporary disabili-
ties and should be treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance
or sick leave plan available in connection with employment.
27. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 347 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Va. 1972). The defendants moved
for a change of venue, and the plaintiffs moved to add parties as plaintiffs and to amend the
complaint to overcome any adverse venue possibilities. The original plaintiffs were from
Salem, Virginia within the venue of the Western District of Virginia. The court found plain-
tiffs' motion unnecessary while allowing it. The court noted that 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(f)
(1974) conferred jurisdiction upon any judicial district in a state where the unlawful employ-
ment practice is alleged to have been committed and held that the venue was proper for the
action brought.
28. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 59 F.R.D. 267 (E.D. Va. 1973).
29. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367 (E.D. Va. 1974).
30. Id. at 386. Judge Merhige found that the "sex discrimination is self evident" and that
there was "no rational distinction to be drawn between pregnancy related disabilities and a
disability arising from any other cause." Id. at 385.
31. 519 F.2d at 667-68.
32. Id. at 665-67.
33. Id. at 665.
34. General Electric argued that prior EEOC guidelines, which denied that pregnancy was
a compensable disability, should be used for "guidance" or given "minimal weight." Id. at
664 n.12.
[Vol. 10:380
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this as irrelevant, holding that the guidelines, while helpful in determining
the meaning and purpose of the Act, are not binding upon the court."
The defendants based their strongest argument36 for overruling the lower
court upon the recent decision of Geduldig v. Aiello."7 In Geduldig female
employees in California attacked a statewide disability program because
it did not allow benefits for pregnancy-related absences. 8 The Supreme
Court applied the traditional minimum rationality test39 to a California
statute"0 holding that the state legislature need only show a rational basis
for its classification.4" Although the challenged classification was admit-
tedly underinclusive, the Court held that the legislature could attack this
disability program problem in a piecemeal fashion. 2 The Court perceived
nothing irrational in excluding normal pregnancy leave benefits along with
other non-compensable disabilities.3
The Gilbert court read Geduldig as not applying to actions under Title
VIIU citing two recent circuit decisions." The court reasoned that Geduldig
found discrimination but not invidious discrimination,46 and concluded
that Title VII forbids any type of discrimination whatsoever. This reason-
ing can be questioned in light of the language in Geduldig that "[tihere
is no evidence in the record that the selection of the risks insured by
the program worked to discriminate against any definable group or
35. Id.
36. Id. at 665-66.
37. 417 U.S. 484 (1974), rev'g, Aiello v. Hansen, 359 F. Supp. 792 (N.D. Cal. 1973). For a
full discussion of the implications of this case see Comment, Pregnancy and the Constitution:
The Uniqueness Trap, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1532 (1974) [hereinafter cited as The Uniqueness
Trap].
38. 417 U.S. at 486.
39. This is sometimes referred to as the "permissive review." See generally Equal Protec-
tion, supra note 21, at 1077.
40. CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CoDE § 2626 (West Supp. 1974). This section at that time defined
compensable disabilities so as to exclude any pregnancy-related illness or injuries sustained
either during gestation or for 28 days following birth.
41. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 495 (1974).
42. Id. The Court also upheld a legislative attack in a piecemeal fashion in Williams v.
Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
43. 417 U.S. at 495. Other exclusions were: short term (had to exceed 7 days), long term
(could not exceed 26 weeks), and court commitments (as a dipsomaniac, drug addict, or
sexual psychopath). Id. at 488. As of 1974 ten other states had unemployment compensation
programs that denied benefits to pregnant women. The Uniqueness Trap, supra note 34, at
1535.
44. 519 F.2d at 665-66.
45. Wetzel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 43 U.S.L.W.
3624 (U.S. May 27, 1975) (No. 74-1245); Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel.
Co., 513 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1974).
46. 519 F.2d at 666-67.
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class. . . ."I' Geduldig does not mention sex discrimination per se except
indirectly by way of a footnote. 8 The sine qua non then of the court's
decision is whether note 20 in Geduldig does find sex-linked discrimination
in denial of pregnancy benefits.
The court in Gilbert may have been on firmer ground if it had focused
instead on the apparent distinctions between the disability plan in
Geduldig and the General Electric plan. The former provided benefits for
any abnormal conditions in pregnancy and disallowed claims only for nor-
mal delivery and recovery." The latter disallowed any pregnancy-related
disability claims."0 Further, the California plan was funded solely from
employee contributions,' whereas General Electric's plan was funded by
the employer and was a union bargained-for benefit.52 Since courts have
traditionally been unsympathetic with claims of increased business ex-
pense as a reason for not complying with legislation, 3 this difference might
be a basis for distinguishing Geduldig.
In his dissent in Gilbert Judge Widener argued that Geduldig should
control. He believed that Geduldig was written with an eye to future ac-
tions brought under Title VII.1 The briefs for the amici curiae in Geduldig
47. 417 U.S. at 496 (emphasis added). A number of courts have agreed with EEOC 1972
guidelines holding that pregnancy classifications in benefit programs discriminate against
women because of their sex. See Farkas v. South West City School Dist., 8 E.P.D. T 9619
(S.D. Ohio 1974); Dessenberg v. American Metal Forming Co., 8 E.P.D. T 9575 (N.D. Ohio
1973); Vick v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 6 E.P.D. 8933 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
48. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20. This note was the answer to the dissent challenging the majority
to explain why this case was different from Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson which
made sex a suspect classification (by a plurality not a majority of the Supreme Court) and
subjected the legislation to an intermediate level of review. See generally Comment, Geduldig
v. Aiello: Pregnancy Classifications and the Definition of Sex Discrimination, 75 COLuM. L.
REv. 441, 446 (1975).
49. CAL. UNEMPL. INS. CODE § 2626 was amended following Rentzer v. California Unemploy-
ment Ins. Appeal Bd., 32 Cal. App. 3d 604, 108 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1973), to extend coverage to
disability from medical complications arising due to pregnancy.
50. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 369 (E.D. Va. 1974).
51. The Court explained that any extension of the coverage would mean less benefit
amounts for each claim or a rise in the percentage and/or total dollar amount of employee
contribution. Each employee contributed one percent of his annual wages up to a present
maximum of $90. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. at 499 n.1 (Brennan, J.; dissenting).
52. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 371 (E.D. Va. 1974).
53. Id. at 382. The court said: "[lit is doubtful in the first instance if cost alone would
constitute a proper defense." See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 799 n.8 (4th Cir.
1971).
54. 519 F.2d at 669. (Widener, J., dissenting). At least one other court has also accepted
this interpretation of Geduldig. In Communications Workers v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
379 F. Supp. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), the court read Geduldig as holding "that California's
treatment of pregnancy disabilities did not in and of itself constitute a discrimination based
on sex [or gender]." Id. at 682.
[Vol. 10:380
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pointed out to the Court the Title VII cases pending with sex discrimina-
tion issues." The dissent also argued that the majority decision ignored its
own statement in a previous case that "the test of validity under Title VII
is not different from the test of validity under the fourteenth amend-
ment.""6 Judge Widener found this statement contradictory to the Gilbert
holding that Title VII had a greater reach than the fourteenth amend-
ment.5
The issues involved here will probably be resolved when the Supreme
Court hears Wetzel v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company." The facts in
Wetzel are almost identical to those in the Gilbert case." The insurance
company advanced the same arguments for its pregnancy exclusions." The
Wetzel court disposed of these on the same basis as did the Gilbert court. 1
The Third Circuit in Wetzel did not find Geduldig controlling, citing the
difference between an equal protection claim and a legislative determina-
tion."2
It is submitted that the Supreme Court may well join both cases for a
decision as the facts and holdings are nearly identical. If, however, Gilbert
is heard separately,n the Court may employ this opportunity to distinguish
Geduldig and still affirm the Fourth Circuit's decision without reaching
the issue of whether withholding pregnancy benefits is per se sex discrimi-
nation. In Geduldig the Court stated:
Absent a showing that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect invidious discrimination against the members of one sex
or the other, lawmakers are constitutionally free to include or exclude preg-
nancy from the coverage of legislation such as this on any reasonable basis,
just as with respect to any other physical condition."
55. Brief for Appellant at 20 n.26, 519 F.2d 661.
56. United States v. Chesterfield County School Dist., 484 F.2d 70, 73 (4th Cir. 1973).
57. 519 F.2d at 669 (Widener, J., dissenting).
58. 372 F. Supp. 1146 (W.D. Pa. 1974), afl'd, 511 F.2d 199 (3d Cir. 1975). The Supreme
Court has granted certiorari. 95 S. Ct. 1989.
59. In Wetzel, the plaintiffs are also attacking, among other things, their employer's wage
continuation plan which excludes benefits for any disabilities related to pregnancy. As in
Gilbert, pregnancy is the only disability of any duration that is excluded and just as in
Gilbert, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's decision holding such exclusions violative
of Title VII. 511 F.2d at 209.
60. Id. at 206.
61. Id. at 205-06. The Wetzel court also had to decide a maternity leave issue. The court
again allowed great deference to the Commission's guidelines, holding that the policies were
based on class generalizations of one sex, and that the leave policies were also violative of
Title VII as a matter of law. Id. at 208.
62. See note 31 and accompanying text supra.
63. A petition for certiorari has been granted. 44 U.S.L.W. 3200 (U.S. Oct. 7, 1975) (Nos.
74-1589, -1590).
64. 417 U.S. at 496 n.20 (emphasis added).
1976]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
The Court could hold that General Electric's plan with its broader preg-
nancy exclusions, given the background of past female discrimination by
General Electric,"5 is a mere pretext effecting invidious discrimination
clearly forbidden by Title VII. It may also hold that the Geduldig decision
should be limited in application to legislative plans for pregnancy disabili-
ties, or in the alternative, that designers of the plan are constitutionally
free but not legislatively free to effect such exclusions. Such a decision
would rule out legislative prohibitions set forth in Title VII. Until the
Supreme Court decides Wetzel and/or hears Gilbert, private employers
with disability plans similar to that of General Electric will wait expect-
antly and apprehensively to see if their "fringe benefit" programs will have
to absorb the great expense necessarily involved in paying pregnancy-
related disability claims. 6
H.I.H.
65. Gilbert v. General Elec. Co., 375 F. Supp. 367, 380 (E.D. Va. 1974). Although the court
did not reach plaintiffs' claim that the employer's history was dominated by a strain of male
chauvinism, it pointed to several acts by GE that might be considered strong indications of
prior intentional female discrimination.
66. In affirming, the Fourth Circuit suggested that the district court might defer further
proceedings at least until Wetzel is decided. 519 F.2d at 668 n.25.
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